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I 
ABSTRACT 
The Chinese stock markets have been operated for more than ten years, however, 
there are only a few researches on the impact of dividend policies to the listed 
Chinese firms. This study focuses on whether we can predict the future dividend 
amount; and whether the cash dividends can provide future signals for investors' 
decision. Based on 3882 cash dividend announcements from 654 firms, we can 
predict the current dividend amount by using information of previous dividend 
amount and current Earning Per Share (EPS). Nevertheless, we cannot predict 
change dividend change by using current EPS change. In addition, we are unable to 
figure out any significant signaling effect between the change in dividend and the 
abnormal returns, with the exception of our finding that a significant negative 
abnormal return will be retrieved when there is no change in dividends. As the 
result, we conclude that the signaling explanation cannot entirely explain why 
Chinese listed companies will pay dividends. 
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The ongoing economic reform from the Mainland Government introduces a new drive 
and promotes the transparency of the stock markets. The accession of WTO 
encourages foreign investors in acquiring leading Chinese companies in order to 
maintain a balanced portfolio. Traditionally, dividend yield is one of the major 
factors that to be considered by the institutional investors. Whilst dividend payment 
is always welcomed by every shareholder, companies that are too generous in 
dividend payment may reserve inadequate capital for future development and 
expansion. Therefore, every management of the listed companies considers 
carefully in adopting its dividend policy in order to fit the company's ongoing 
strategies, and at the same time, appropriate shareholder values have to be created. 
In our studies, we would try to simulate the impact of dividend payment to the stock 
prices, with the pool of companies that being listed in the Chinese Stock Exchanges. 
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Financial modeling, namely "Fama and Babiak Model", "The Percentage Adjusted 
Model PAM" and "CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) Analysis", will be adopted in 
the following studies. Our primary objective is to define whether dividend policies 
will affect the stock prices severely and in what degree. Industry analysis, together 
with the references on capital sizes, will also be conducted in the following chapters. 
Since some listings in China do proceed dual-listing status in Hong Kong (known as 
"H" shares), we will indeed find out whether dividend policy will generate different 
degree of impact to companies with more than 1 listing status or not. 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF CHINA SECURITIES MARKETS 
In December 1990, the first Chinese stock exchange was established in Shanghai. Six 
months later, another stock exchange was operated in Shenzhen. The initial 
objective for the setting up of the Exchanges was to provide state-owned enterprises a 
medium to raise funds from the general public and introduce the business to the 
potential investors. Thus, under the 'corporatisation of state-owned enterprises' 
policy of the Mainland Government, several state-owned companies were converted 
to limited companies and being listed on the Exchanges. At the end of 2002, there 
were 715 and 508 companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange respectively. By the time，the Shanghai stock market capitalization had 
been reached to US$306 billion; whilst the Shenzhen stock market capitalization had 
been valued to US$156 billion (Note: USDl = RMB8.28). Table 1 outlines the 
demography of Chinese Stock Market. 
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In 1992, the State Securities Committee and the Securities Regulatory Commission 
were set up, providing a mechanism to regulate the securities market. The State 
Securities Committee is the ultimate governing authority of the Chinese securities 
market. Its duties include:-
1. organizing and drafting of related laws and regulations, 
2. preparing developmental strategies and plans, 
3. guiding, coordinating, supervising, and reviewing the work of related central 
government agencies and local government bodies, and 
4. monitoring the operations of the State Securities Regulatory Commission. 
The State Securities Commission acts as the executive arm of the State Securities 
Committee and therefore plays an important role in development and day-to-day 
management of the securities market. For instance, listed companies have to submit 
various financial reports (including the prospectus, listing report, periodic reports, 
current reports and reports on intended takeover) to the Commission. Summaries of 
these reports have to be formally disclosed in newspapers that specified by the 
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Commission. 
It is not a surprise that the State (or the municipal government) has the rights to own a 
proportion of shares of some Chinese listed companies, since a number of these 
companies are former state owned enterprises. In general, there are two types of 
shares that can be issued on the Stock Exchanges. One called 'A, shares, which are 
only available to investors in China. Another called 'B' shares, which are traded in 
terms of Hong Kong dollars (for Shenzhen Stock Exchange) or United State dollars 




WHY FIRMS PAY DIVIDENDS 
Extensive literatures had covered to the dividend policy of companies. As per Miller 
and Modigliani's discussion (1961), when there are no taxes or transaction costs and 
all investors are entirely informed about the distribution of the company's uncertainty 
on future cash flows, dividend policy is irrelevance. Somehow, dividend policy does 
not matter in some circumstances. However, it is a reality that many companies still 
pay dividend. Hence, dividend policy may occasionally matter. As the result, 
researchers have offered four universal explanations to discuss why firms pay 
dividends: the Bird-in-the-Hand, Signaling, Tax-Preference, and Agency cost 
explanations. 
The Bird-in-the-Hand Explanation 
According to this explanation, investors prefer dividend to uncertain share price 
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appreciation as the investors view distant dividend payments as riskier than current 
payments. Therefore, companies should set a high dividend payout ratio and offer a 
high dividend yield to maximize stock prices. 
However, both Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Bhattacharya (1979) argue that 
Bird-in-the-Hand explanation is fallacious. It is because the risk of a firm should be 
based on riskiness of a company's cash flows. Increase of dividend payout today 
will result in an equivalent drop�in the stock's ex-dividend price. As the result, 
increasing the dividend today cannot increase firm's value as the riskiness of future 
cash flows does not change (or is not predictable). The Bird-in-the-Hand explanation 
is therefore fallacious. 
The Signaling Explanation 
Another explanation for paying dividends is using dividend policy to reveal 
information on the future prospect of a firm to investors. Signaling explanation 
emphasizes on the role of dividend policy under asymmetric information delivery. 
Information asymmetry suggests that corporate managers have more information than 
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outside investors. Hence, managers may use a change in dividends as a way to 
signal this private information and，thus, reduce information asymmetry. As the 
result, increase of dividend payout will generate a signal that the firm has enough 
future cash flows. The ongoing debt payments and dividend payments will not 
generate the risk of bankruptcy. This suggests that dividend changes should lead, 
rather than lag, earning changes and investors may use dividend announcements as 
the information to assess the appropriate stock price of a firm. 
Ross (1977), Bhattacharya (1979, 1980)，John and Williams (1985)，Miller and Rock 
(1985)，and Ofer and Thakor (1987) developed many models to assert this explanation. 
They found that there is a positive relationship amongst dividend policy changes, 
equity values, and subsequent performance. However, dividend changes may not be 
perfect signals. According to Easterbrook (1984), dividend increases may be an 
ambiguous signal, unless the market can distinguish between growing firms and 
disinvesting firms, i.e., those with a lack of investment opportunities. In addition, 
signaling explanation cannot explain cross-sectional differences in dividend payout 
across firms successfully. 
9 
The Tax-Preference Explanation 
It is obvious that taxation may affect the dividend policy. Investors may favor 
retention of funds over the payment of dividends because of the favorable treatment 
of capital gains over dividends. Hence, as previously mentioned, investors may 
prefer low dividend payout to high payout. This theory suggests that firms should 
keep dividend payments low if they want to maximize prices (via the impression of 
retaining capital for future development). 
Masulis and Trueman (1986) showed that the cost of deferring dividends may be large 
enough to induce firms to optimally pay cash dividends. Shareholders with different 
tax rates will have different preferences on dividend decision. High tax bracket 
shareholders would prefer more investment and less dividend payout; whilst low tax 
bracket shareholders would prefer less investment and more dividend payout. Since 
tax effect differs from different types of investors, companies can adopt various 
dividend policies to attract certain type of investors from a particular tax bracket. 
Researchers call this as the tax clientele effect. Other things being equal, stocks with 
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low payouts should attract investors in high tax brackets, leaving high payout stocks 
to investors who are subjected to low or zero tax rates. 
However, the empirical evidence on the tax-preference explanation of dividends is 
inconclusive. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) showed that stocks with large 
dividend yields have lower prices and offer higher returns. On the Contrary, Black 
and Scholes (1974) and Miller and Scholes (1982) reported that a firm's value is 
independent of dividend policy. 
The Agency Explanation 
Agency theory was derived by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and was extended by 
Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984). This theory was based on the conflict of 
interests between corporate managers (agents) and outside shareholders (owners). 
Corporate managers may increase their personal wealth, in line with their decisions to 
the expense of the outside shareholders through more perquisites or shirking. As the 
result, the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the 
agency costs. One way to reduce agency costs is to increase dividends. Paying 
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larger dividends reduces the internal cash flow that subjected to management 
discretion and forces the firm to seek more external financing. Seeking outside 
capital makes the firm to the scrutiny of the capital market for new funds and reduces 
the possibility of suboptimal investment. In addition, outside investors (or capital 
providers) will monitor the companies, ensuring that managers act in the best interest 
of outside shareholders. Thus, dividend payments may serve as a mean of 
monitoring or evaluating management performance. The agency costs explanation 
of dividends suggests that increases in dividends lag increases in profits and are 
uncorrelated with future profits. 
Several empirical studies also provide support for the agency explanation for 
dividends. Rozeff (1982) found a supporting ground for the role of dividends in 
resolving agency costs in minority-manager-controlled firms. He pointed out that 
there is a negative relationship between dividend payout and the percentage of 
individual shareholders. If there are a lower percentage of individual shareholders, 
less dividends has to be paid to reduce agency costs. Additionally, he also verified 
that the variability of a firm's cash flows would affect its dividend payout. Moreover, 
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there is an optimal dividend policy as the strong cross-sectional regularities exist. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995) concluded that 




HOW TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF DIVIDENDS TO PAY 
In Lintner's (1956) research, he interviewed selected companies to investigate how 
they determined the dividend. He found out that managers focused on the change in 
the current dividend payout ratio. In addition, most managers tried to avoid making 
changes in their dividend rates that might need to change within a year. Moreover, 
investment requirements generally had little effect on changing the dividend behavior. 
Lintner (1956) suggested that the change in dividends is a function of the target 
dividend payout less the last period's dividend payout, multiplied by the speed of an 
adjustment factor. The target dividend payout is a fraction of the current period's 
earnings. 
Many studies supported the model that being described by Lintner. Fama and 
Babiak (1968) found out that Lintner's model is one of the best two models to explain 
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dividend policy and to predict dividend payments one year later. Benartzi, Michaely 
and Thaler (1997，pp. 1032) concluded that "... Lintner's model of dividends remains 
the best description of the dividend setting process available." Studies from Baker, 




We collected the 1) Daily Stock Prices，2) Dividend Per Share and 3) Earning Per 
Share for all the companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange from 01 December 1990 to 31 July 2002. In general, there are 1146 
listing shares (A and B shares) announced 5252 cash dividend events (included 3990 
non-zero cash dividend announcements and others are zero cash dividends). 44 
companies have no EPS data. The missing data are primarily due to: 1) incomplete 
information from Bloomberg; 2) we cannot find corresponding data from annual 
reports or other sources. We also filter the data to exclude the firms which either 
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have short listing time (Less than or equal to 2 years) or have short cash dividend 
history (Less than 2 years). Finally, as there are some companies have A and B 
shares and have same data, we exclude their B shares data. As the result, there are 
654 firms with 3882 cash dividend announcements left in our dataset. The summary 
of data is recorded in Table 2. Table 3 and 4 show the number of change of Earning 
Per Share and Dividend Per Share respectively. 
In addition, as shown in Table 5, about 26% of companies (n=833) have increased 
cash dividends, 37% of companies (n=1208) have decreased cash dividends and 37% 
(n=1187) of companies have not changed dividend amount. A casual inspection of 
Table 5 suggests that 57% of increase in cash dividends occurs when earnings 
increases. About 62% of decrease in cash dividends occurs when earning decreases. 
The chi-square test of the independence of the cash dividend and earning per share 
rejects the null hypothesis of independence. The chi-square value is 88.95. The 
correlation coefficient between cash dividend and current earning per share is 0.3878. 
After we perform a correlation test between cash dividends and current earning per 
share, we find out that this test indicates there is high level of dependence (t-value = 
23.96，which is significant at the 0.01 level). 
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Model (L3) 
Fama and Babiak Model 
We use the model of Fama and Babiak (1968) to predict the next period's dividends. 
The equation is: 
Divt= a + piDivt-i + P2EPSt+St 
where 
Divt = Dividend per share at time t 
Divt-i = Dividend per share at time t-1 
EPSt = Earning per share at time t 
St = the error term 
After we run the regression model, we find out that all coefficients are found to be 
significant (See Table 6). However, this model can only explain 16% (R^) of 
dividend in the next period. As per our observation and understanding, this model 
may be improved by adding other variables such as previous Earning Per Share. 
Additionally, the coefficients of EPSt is more than that of Divt-i. This indicates that 
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the current year EPS can affect the current dividend in a greater extent than the 
previous year's dividend. Furthermore, the Intercept term is positive. This shows 
that Chinese listing companies have a tendency to pay cash dividends, no matter 
current EPS is positive or zero. 
The Percentage Adjusted Model (PAM) 
We have made use the Percentage Adjusted Model to test the hypothesized positive 
link between institutional ownership and dividend policy. If changes in income are 
considered permanent and a firm has a desired payout ratio r, the association between 
changes in earnings (E) and changes in dividends (D)，for firm i at time t, will be 
given by: 
Da - 1)/ - a 体 一 五 + /% 
where, 
Dti = Dividend per share at time t 
T>(t.i)i = Dividend per share at time t-1 
E/, = Earning per share at time t 
^(t-i)i = Earning per share at time t-1 
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However, the relationship between the difference in the dividend payout and earning 
per share are in absolute value, which is not being normalized. Taking an example 
of a company pay out 2 dollar as dividend at year 0 and pay out 3 dollars in the 
subsequence year, the difference in dividend is 1 dollar. But if we consider another 
company which pays out 10 dollar as dividend at year 0 and 11 dollar in the sequence 
year, the difference in dividend is also one dollar. Obviously, the amount of 
dividend paid out is being accounted; it just considers the absolute variation instead. 
Similarly, this insufficiency applies to the part of earning per share, which only 
determines the variation without taking the actual amount of earning per share into 
consideration. 
We use the similar model of the full adjustment one with a modification of the 
absolute value. The percentage changes in dividend between two-time period and the 
percentage changes in earning per share are used for replacing the two absolute 
difference. The equation becomes: 
% change in D,- = a + y(% change in EQ + St 
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where 
% change in Dj = [ Dti- D(t-i)i ] / D(t-i)i 
% change in Ei = [Eti - E(t-i)i ] / E(t-i)i 
St = the error term 
After we run the regression model, we find out that the coefficients are found to be 
statistically significant (See Table 7). However, based on the tiny % for the 
calculated R Square, it is concluded that the % change in dividend cannot be 
explained by this model. Furthermore, the Intercept term is negative. It appears 
that Chinese listing companies have a tendency to reduce the dividend whenever there 
is a decline in profit. 
It should be worth to note that some criteria were adopted in screening out the data for 
running the regression analysis. As all data including % change in dividend and the 
% change in earning per share may result in negative signs. There should be no 
negative value for dividend paid out, however, it is not entirely the case in earning per 
share, i.e. loss can be booked. Two scenarios are being found for negative % change 
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in earning per share. The usual explanation is that there is a decline in earning per 
share between period t and t-1. But for the case of having a negative earning per 
share in the period of t-1, even though there is a reducing drop (there is no such 
problem for an increasing drop in earning per share) in earning in the period t, the 
output will also be negative, which distorts the regression result. 
Data (% change in earning per share) with "below -100%" are filtered out from the 
raw data. This assumption can be explained that company will not pay out dividend 
whenever there is a substantial loss in its fiscal year, say drop to zero or even 
recording a loss. With the use of this criterion, data fall in Scenario 2, unusual 
negative can be filtered out. 
CAR Analysis 
We have used the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) Analysis with 7 days window 
to show how shareholders react to the dividend announcements. If shareholders 
react positively to the announcements of change of cash dividends, the signaling 
theory can potentially explain the dividend puzzle in China. Table 8 shows the 
21 
Average Return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) from 7 days before 
the announcements of cash dividend to 7 days after. 
From the Table, we can pinpoint that when there is a positive change in cash dividend, 
with a slightly positive CAR value (+0.23%), but not significant. When there is a 
negative change in cash dividend, the CAR value is slightly negative (-0.33%), but 
also not significant. However, when there is no change in cash dividend, the CAR 
value is notably negative (-2.56%). One explanation is that the signaling theory 
cannot explain the dividend puzzle in China. Another reason is that as most of 
Chinese companies provide stock dividends as well as cash dividends, the signaling 





In our studies, we will follow the industry classification as defined by the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The former will categorize listings 
into 5 distinctive groups:-
Commercial, Industrial, Property, Utility and Miscellaneous 
Whilst for the Shenzhen listings, companies will be classified into 22 specific 
industries, which are:-
Agriculture, Conglomerates, Construction, Electronics, 
Financials, Food & Beverage, IT, Machinery, 
Manufacturing, Media, Metals & Non-metals，Mining, 
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Paper & Printing, Petrochemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Real 
Estate, Social Services, Textiles & Apparel, Timber & 
Furnishings, Transportation, Utilities and Wholesale & 
Retail 
Table 9a and 9b show the Industry Classification for both Shenzhen and Shanghai 
Listings respectively as per the information up to end March 2003. 
For the population that we consider in our studies, there are 9 companies in Shanghai 
and 1 company in Shenzhen with dual-listing status in Hong Kong as "H-shares", 
which are recorded in Table 10. 
The dividend yields of companies from different industry have been calculated as 
shown in Table 11. Unexpectedly, utility sectors in both Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges are not very generous in dividend payment, with dividend yield of 
32.21% and 40.52% respectively. However, utility industry in Shanghai is the 
highest dividend providers amongst the 5 sectors. 
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In Shenzhen, Mining Industry is the most generous sector in average payouts 
(87.53%), followed by Financial Industry (81.41%) surprisingly. There is no 
dividend payout for the Agriculture and Timber & Furnishings Industries (note: 
population is small as well). Additionally, the payout ratios from industries like 
Construction (4.56%), IT (18.42%), Manufacturing (16.80%) and Real Estates 
(18.7%) are relatively low. 
We also examine the dividend payout trend with respect to the company market 
capitalization sizes. Table 12 shows the average dividend payout of companies with 
regard to their capitalization sizes. It is interesting to point out that the larger the 





After we run several models, we can predict the current dividend amount by using 
previous dividend amount and current Earning per share (EPS). However, we 
cannot predict dividend change by using current EPS change. In addition, we can 
conclude that there is a significant change in dividend if there is no change in EPS 
from the CAR Analysis. However, there is no significant change in dividend if there 
is change in EPS from the CAR test. As the result, we conclude that the signaling 
explanation cannot explain why Chinese listed companies will pay dividends. 
We would suggest further studies should include not only the cash dividends, but also 
the stock dividends. Then the result may be more meaningful and conclusive. In 
addition, other tests, such as tax effect and agency cost, should also be adopted in 
order to generate a more thorough picture of the issue being discussed in this paper. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Summary Data of Chinese Stock Market 
Up to 31-Dec-2002 Shanghai Exchange Shenzhen Exchange 
No. of Listed Companies ^ ^ 
Listed Companies with A Shares ^ ^ 
Listed Companies with B Shares M 
Listed Companies Have A and B Shares ^ ^ 
Listed Companies Only have B shares 
Market Capitalization (billion USD) 
A Shares 300.98 152.24 
B Shares ^ 
T^tal Market Capitalization 306.33 156.59 
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Table 2; Summary of Data 
No. of Firms Left No. of Cash Dividend Events Left 
Original Data Obtained 
Minus Missing EPS ^ 
Minus Short EPS History ^ 
Minus Short Dividend History 
Minus HaveA&B Shares 654 ^ 
Table 3: EPS Change 
Total Exclude first announcement 
Increase 2861 2207 
Decrease 2277 2217 
No Change J} J} 
H^l 5209 4555 
Table 4: Cash Dividend Change 
Total Exclude first announcement 
Increase 1487 ^ 
Decrease 1208 ^ 
No Change ^ 
Total 3882 3228 
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Table 5: EPS Change and Cash Dividend Change 
EPS change\Div change Increase Decrease No Change Not Available Total 
Increase 476 445 一 551 735 2207 
Decrease ^ 751 ^ 563 2277 
No Change 15 12 15 ^ Z1 
Total 833+ 1208! 1187| 
The chi-square test of independence of the cash dividend and earning per share: chi-square = 88.95 
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Table 6; Regression Result - Fama and Babiak Model 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.4013 
R Square 0.1610 
Adjusted R Square 0.1605 
ANOVA 
m ^ ^ F Significance F 
Regression 2 5.9764 2.9882 311.2673 0 
Residual 3225 31.9600 0.0096 
Total 3227 36.9364 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 0.0513 0.0019 26.4130 2.0418E-139 
EPSt 0.1308 0.0056 23.2720 6.4813E-111 
Divt-i 0.0326 0.0051 6.4181 1.58Q83E-10 
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Table 7: Regression Result - The Percentage Adjusted Model (PAM) 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.0300 
R Square 0.0009 
Adjusted R Square 0.0006 
Standard Error 0.6289 
Observations 4471 
ANOVA 
Df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 1.6025 1.6025 4.0516 0.0441 
Residual 4469 1767.6531 0.39553 
Total 4470 1769.2557 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.1094 0.0094 -11.6083 1.0264E-30 
% change in E； 0.0025 0.0012 2.0128 0.0441 
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Table 8: CAR summary 
Event Increase Decrease No Change 
Day AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
0.03% Q.03% -0.18% -0.18% -0.21% -0.21% 
^ 0.25% 0 . 2 ^ 0.02% -0.16% -0.10% -0.31% 
^ 0.12% 0.41% -0.15% -0.31% 0.01% -0.30% 
0.07% 0 . 4 ^ -0.05% -0.36% -0.13% -0.43% 
^ -0.03% 0.45% -0.01% -0.38% -0.14% -0.57% 
0.09% 0.54% 0.06% -0.31% -0.17% -0.74% 
A - 0 . 0 3 % 0.51% 0 . 1 5 % - 0 . 1 6 % -0.20% - 0 . 9 4 % 
0 0.45% 0.96% -0.01% -0.17% 0.03% -0.91% 
1 0.09% l . o i 0.06% -0.12% 0.00% -0.92% 
2 0.31% 1 . 3 6 ^ 0.03% -0.09% -0.18% -1.10% 
3 -0.15% 1.22% 0.05% -0.03% -0.45% -1.55% 
4 -0.36% 0.85% -0.17% -0.21% -0.46% -2.01% 
5 -0.41% 0.44% -0.02% -0.23% -0.35% -2.35% 
6 -0.30% 0.15% 0.03% -0.20% 0.07% -2.28% 
7 0.08% -0.12% -0.33% “ -0.28% -2.56% 
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Table 9a: Industry Classification - Shenzhen Listings 
Industry (Index) No. of Companies 
Shenzhen SE Agriculture Index 2 
Shenzhen SE Conglomerates Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Construction Index 8 
Shenzhen SE Electronics Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Financials Index 3 
Shenzhen SE Food & Beverage Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE IT Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Machinery Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Manufacturing Index 6 
Shenzhen SE Media Index 3 
Shenzhen SE Metals & Non-metals Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Mining Index 8 
Shenzhen SE Paper & Printing Index 
Shenzhen SE Petrochemicals Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Pharmaceuticals Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Real Estate Index \9 
Shenzhen SE Social Services Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Textiles & Apparel Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Timber & Furnishings Index 1 
Shenzhen SE Transportation Index H 
Shenzhen SE Utilities Index ^ 
Shenzhen SE Wholesale & Retail Index ^ 
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Table 9b: Industry Classification - Shanghai Listings 
Industry (Index) No. of Companies 
Shanghai SE Commercial Subindex ^ 
Shanghai SE Industrial Subindex ^ 
Shanghai SE Misc Subindex 
Shanghai SE Property Subindex ]6 
Shanghai SE Utility Subindex 62 
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Table 10: Companies that being dual-listed in Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange Company Name 
Shenzhen Angang Newsteel Co Ltd. 
Shanghai China Eastern Airlines Corporation Ltd. 
Shanghai China Shipping Development Co Ltd. 
Shanghai Huaneng Power International Inc. 
Shanghai Jiangsu Expressway Co Ltd. 
Shanghai Maanshan Iron and Steel Co Ltd. 
Shanghai Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co Ltd. 
Shanghai Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co Ltd. 
Shanghai Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd. 
Shanghai Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd. 
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Table 11; Dividend Pavout - By Industry 
Industry and Location of Listings Average Payout Ratio 
Shenzhen SE Agriculture Index 0.00% 
Shenzhen SE Conglomerates Index 24.44% 
Shenzhen SE Construction Index 4.56% 
Shenzhen SE Electronics Index 34.01% 
Shenzhen SE Financials Index 81-41% 
Shenzhen SE Food & Beverage Index 37.11% 
Shenzhen SE IT Index 18.42% 
Shenzhen SE Machinery Index 40.90% 
Shenzhen SE Manufacturing Index 16.80% 
Shenzhen SE Media Index 40.10% 
Shenzhen SE Metals & Non-metals Index 40.07% 
Shenzhen SE Mining Index 87.53% 
Shenzhen SE Paper & Printing Index 43.00% 
Shenzhen SE Petrochemicals Index 39.39% 
Shenzhen SE Pharmaceuticals Index 24.67% 
Shenzhen SE Real Estate Index 18.71% 
Shenzhen SE Social Services Index 50.14% 
Shenzhen SE Textiles & Apparel Index 24.01% 
Shenzhen SE Timber & Furnishings Index 0-00% 
Shenzhen SE Transportation Index 33.38% 
Shenzhen SE Utilities Index 40.52% 
Shenzhen SE Wholesale & Retail Index 29.75% 
Shanghai SE Commercial Subindex 15.67% 
Shanghai SE Industrial Subindex 18.85% 
Shanghai SE Misc Subindex 21.15% 
Shanghai SE Property Subindex 16.28% 
Shanghai SE Utility Subindex 32.21% 
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Table 12: Dividend Payouts - By Market Capitalization Size 
Capital Size (US$) Average Payout Ratio 
Below lOOOOQOOQ 23.89% 
1000Q0Q0Q-250QQQ0Q0 30.75% 
25Q0Q00Q1 - 500000000 36.22% 
500000001 - 1000000000 38.44% 
1000000001 - 5000000000 42.93% 
Above 5000000001 44.13% 
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